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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This progress report highlights the work over the period 5/2/88 to 6/30/89
under grant NRC-04-88-143, "Physical Dependencies in Accident Sequence
Analysis" [1]. The objective of this project is to develop and demonstrate an
improved accident sequence analysis methodology which will allow better treatment
of the risk associated with plant dynamic behavior, including the effects of "physical
dependencies" between plant safety systems.
In order to accurately describe plant risk, a risk assessment study must
identify and quantify all significant dependent failures of plant safety systems. As
described in Ref. 1, conventional event tree/fault tree approaches are unable to
perform either task in many cases where an initial failure increases the likelihood of
subsequent failures because of the response of plant process variables (e.g., pressure
and temperature) to the initial failure. In such cases, the failures are
probabilistically dependent; the term "physical dependencies" is used to refer to the
coupling between failure events due to the behavior of plant process variables (as
opposed to "logical dependencies" caused by the direct interaction of systems).
The original objectives of the project, as stated in Ref. 1, were to develop and
demonstrate an improved accident sequence analysis methodology which would
allow better treatment of physical dependencies. The project approach intended to
accomplish this objective consisted of five tasks:
1) Identification of actually experienced nuclear power plant accident
scenarios in which physical dependencies have been significant.
2) Identification of candidate models for efficiently treating these scenarios.
3) Comparison of candidate models in case studies.
4) Characterization of models for application to general scenarios.
5) Documentation and dissemination of results.
Based upon the research performed to date, slight changes in the project
objectives and in the task definitions have been made. The project objective,
mentioned at the beginning of this section, now addresses plant dynamic behavior.
This broadening of the original objective allows more careful treatment of the
interface between the accident sequence model and operator models. The current
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Task 4 now emphasizes to a greater degree the implementation of a particular
modeling framework (the DYLAM methodology). Less effort will be spent on
identifying and characterizing a wide variety of candidate methodologies for treating
process variables (Tasks 2 and 3).
The motivation underlying these changes in the project objective and tasks is
discussed in Section 2 of this report. The remainder of the report discusses the
results obtained to date.
Section 3 summarizes the results obtained for Task 1. It is shown that
relatively few of the accident and accident precursor scenarios experienced in the
years 1969-1979 and 1985 appear to involve physical dependencies. This indicates
that the current event tree/fault tree approach currently used in conventional risk
studies is probably appropriate for the scenarios likely to be observed in power
plants. However, physical dependencies have played significant roles in at least one
key incident: the TMI-2 accident (3/79). This strengthens the belief that proper
treatment of physical dependencies is required to assure identification of a plant's
most risk-significant scenarios.
These conclusions cannot be stated more strongly because the summary
information used (Refs. 2 and 3) is not tailored to identify physical dependencies.
Later in this project, additional research on a number of salient accidents will be
performed to make the conclusions more definitive.
Section 4 of this report discusses results from Tasks 2 and 3. Four general
methodologies for treating physical behavior are investigated: expanded event trees,
digraphs, Markov models, and simulation models. The first three approaches, while
easy to apply to simple situations, rapidly become unmanageable when dealing with
complex power plant behavior during a transient. The problem is that they are not
really tailored to treat dynamic scenarios, being essentially static models (the model
structure cannot change with time). These three approaches can be modified to
incorporate some level of dynamics, but the resulting models are often too complex
to be understood by others than the analysts responsible for the models. On the
other hand, the simulation approach employs an explicitly time-dependent
representation of the system being treated. Rules of arbitrary complexity governing
the evolution of a scenario can be incorporated without modification to the basic
structure of the approach. The problems associated with simulation (e.g., sampling
to include rare events, analysis of results from the simulation "black box," and the
potential need for large amounts of computer time) appear to be easier to deal with
than the problems associated with the other approaches.
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The general idea of simulation can be applied to the accident scenario
problem in many ways. Section 4 investigates the DYLAM (Dynamic Logical
Analysis Methodology) approach, a physical equation-based method that has been
proposed for accident sequence analysis [4]. This approach appears to be especially
promising and will be further investigated in this project.
3
2. CHANGES TO PROJECT OBJECTIVES AND TASK STRUCTURE
As stated in Ref. 1, the original proposal to the NRC for this project
emphasized the development of a methodology for treating physical dependencies
between plant systems. Although Ref. 1 recognized that human actions could be
significant contributors to this class of dependent failures, and that models for these
actions would be needed in order to use the methodology for quantitative analysis,
the proposed research did not emphasize the development of explicit methods to
integrate operator models into the overall analysis. It was felt that physical
dependencies could be treated largely by broadening the definition of the current
plant state to include the current values of process variables; as in a conventional
event tree analysis, the impact of the plant state on operator actions would then be
treated by the analysts performing the operator actions analysis.
Research conducted as part of this project and as part of a parallel project on
operator crew modeling (recently funded by the NRC [5]) now indicates that the
objective of this project needs to be broadened slightly. If operators are not
included in the analysis, the earlier model, in which the likelihood of system failure
is modeled as being only dependent on the current values of process variables and
component states, appears to be reasonable. However, when operator actions are
included, the likelihood of failures is also affected by each operator's state of mind.
Note that this seems to be especially important when considering strings of failures.
The operator's current state of mind, in turn, is likely to be affected by the entire
set of preceding events, i.e., the scenario history. Thus, factors not modeled in
current event trees, including the exact order and timing of failure events, and the
time-variation of process variables, may have an impact on the likelihood of
multiple failures.
The above discussion points to the need for a model that treats the dynamic
evolution of an accident scenario. This model will still predict the current values of
process variables, as in the original proposal. In addition, however, it will now keep
track of the scenario history, i.e., how the current state was reached. Moreover,
much greater attention will be paid to the interface with the operator model (the
latter determines what kind of information needs to be carried in the accident
sequence model). The interaction between this project and the parallel MIT
operator crew model project [5] will ensure the integration of the two models.
The broadening of the intended project output (from a model to treat
physical dependencies to one that models plant dynamic behavior) has implications
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for the task structure originally proposed in Ref. 1 and summarized in Section 1. In
particular, Tasks 2-4 envisioned a detailed comparison of a number of competing
methodologies, with the distinct possibility that no one approach would be
uniformly superior to the others. It now appears that logically-oriented
methodologies (event trees/fault trees and digraphs) are inappropriate because of
their weakness in handling time dependence. Rather, a simulation-oriented
approach, which not only handles time dependence naturally, it also can keep track
of scenario history easily, seems to be clearly preferable.
One particular simulation approach, the DYLAM approach, in which
time-dependent event tree structures are generated dynamically, promises to be
especially useful and will be employed in this project. The technical details of the
approach are described in Section 4. Regarding the impact on the project task
structure, Tasks 2 and 3 can be regarded as being essentially complete, even though
the candidate models discussed in Section 4 of this report were not actually applied
in a realistic analysis. On the other hand, Task 4 will be greatly enlarged, as
follows.
DYLAM was originally proposed as a methodology for systems analysis. As
a methodology for accident sequence analysis, it has a severe drawback in that the
number of sequences to be analyzed can become unacceptably large very quickly.
Therefore, it has not, to our knowledge, been applied in a detailed nuclear plant
accident sequence analysis (where dependent failures are of central importance).
The methods proposed in Ref. 4 to limit the number of sequences (truncation based
on probability or on size of cut sets) are not believed to be sufficient to allow
practical implementation of the methodology. Therefore, one of the objectives of
Task 4 will be to develop methods to allow practical implementation of DYLAM.
A second problem with using DYLAM in an accident sequence analysis is
that the model must keep track of the full history of a scenario. Thus, in addition
to the sequence and timing of system failures, and the process variable history, it
must also keep track of each operator's state of mind (indexed in some fashion).
Methods for doing this will also be investigated as part of Task 4.
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3. ACCIDENT SCENARIO IDENTIFICATION
The purpose of this task is better determine the significance of the issue of
physical dependencies (raised in Ref. 1), and, to characterize how these
dependencies might come about. Events A and B are said to be dependent if
P{A AND B} P{A} -P{B}. "Physical dependencies" exist if the performance of a
system causes a change in magnitude of at least one process variable (e.g., coolant
temperature or coolant pressure), which in turn, directly or indirectly influences the
operation of another system.
To perform this task, a large group of the accident and accident precursor
scenarios actually experienced by U.S. commercial nuclear plants is investigated.
Scenarios involving physical dependencies are identified and characterized. No
effort is made to perform a formal statistical analysis; the emphasis is to develop a
representative set of different scenarios that current models should address.
3.1 Data Base for Scenarios
The references used in the review of observed scenarios are the 1985 and
1969-79 precursor studies (2,3]. These studies are reviews of the licensee event
reports (LERs) for incidents that occurred during the indicated years at U.S.
commercial light water reactors (LWRs) in order to identify and classify precursor
events that could lead to severe core damage accidents. When accompanied with
postulated events, these precursors, which involve either initiating events or system
(or equipment) failure, could result in an inadequate core cooling situation. The
1969-79 precursor study initially screened 19400 LERs, reviewed in detail 500 LERs,
and eventually identified 169 precursors. The 1985 precursor study, on the other
hand, started with 3000 LERs, of which 1400 received detailed review, and classified
63 events as precursors to severe core accidents.
The events that were identified in Refs. 2 and 3 as being precursors to severe
core accidents involved the failure of at least one needed mitigating system, the
degradation of more than one needed mitigating system, or an actual initiating
event that required safety system response. A mitigating or safety system refers to
a system designed to prevent an abnormal occurrence from causing safety-related
effects and to bring the plant to an innocuous condition. An initiating event event,
on the other hand, is an occurrence that perturbs the operation of the plant and
requires the performance of plant systems for mitigations. An initiating event could
be a system failure or an external hazard.
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3.2 Selection of a Representative Set of Scenarios
Although a large number of scenarios are covered by the precursor studies,
not all of these scenarios are relevant to this study. To efficiently identify
important scenarios, two criteria are employed to screen the list of precursors.
These criteria should be applicable in screening other precursor studies as well.
They are:
1. Events must have occurred while the plant was operational. This
ensures that the physical dependencies identified are relevant during
plant operation, but can omit some important scenarios.
2. Events of interest must have involved at least two safety systems or
functions (since plant-level dependencies involve at least two systems).
This is implemented by considering only precursor events whose event
trees have at least two affected headings or branches.
Application of the above criteria to the 1969-1979 precursors reduces the
initial 169 precursors to 27 (Table 1). Of these 27 precursors, only one appears to
have involved a physical dependency. This event is the well-known Three-Mile
Island 2 (TMI-2) accident which occurred on March 28, 1979. During the early part
of the accident, the failure of the pilot operated relief valve (PORV) to reclose
resulted in the rise of the pressurizer level, which in turn, led the operator to
throttle the high pressure injection (HPI) system. In this event the two interacting
"systems" were the PORV and the HPI. The water level was the involved process
variable.
To model this sequence, the current event tree approach can show that the
PORV opens, the PORV fails to close, and the HPI fails. The water level-operator
interaction, however, is not shown. For example, Figure 1 shows the TMI-2
sequence using a modified transient event tree from the Oconee risk study [6]. An
analyst determining P{U|TBQ} is supposed to recognize the interaction and
incorporate an appropriate human error term in the fault tree for the HPIS.
Applying the criteria to the 63 precursors in the 1985 precursor study results
in 24 candidate events (Table 2), of which four appear to have involved physical
dependencies. These incidents occurred at Davis-Besse 1 (9 June 1985), Catawba 1
(22 June 1985), Hatch 1 (15 May 1985), and Rancho Seco (26 December 1985).
Davis-Besse 1, Catawba 1 and Hatch 1 involved the multiple opening and reclosing
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of relief valves. The affected functions in these incidents were the demand for the
relief valves to open and the subsequent demand for the relief valves to reclose.
Pressure was the involved process variable. Standard event tree models for multiple
opening and reclosing of relief valves treat the recurring functions (opening and
reclosing of the relief valves) just once in the tree. It is possible for the analyst to
conservatively quantify the branching probability (e.g., by using the probability of
failure for multiple trials). However, there are no guidelines as to the degree of
conservatism to be used. Further, it is not clear that the remainder of the sequence
is independent of the number of relief valve open/close cycles (or of the cause for the
differing number of cycles). For example, the operators' view of the plant and their
subsequent actions may depend on the number of cycles observed.
During the Hatch 1 and Rancho Seco incidents, potential failure events
involving physical dependency occurred. In both cases, equipment failure led to
rapid cooldown, exposing the reactor vessel to failure. In the Hatch 1 incident, the
failure of the safety relief valve (SRV) to reclose for approximately 34 minutes
which resulted in the temperature cooldown rate that exceeded the technical
specifications. In the Rancho Seco incident, a stuck open auxiliary feedwater
(AFW) manual isolation valve erroneously allowed water to overfill a steam
generator and prevented the early recovery from an overcooling condition. Thus, a
rapid reactor coolant system (RCS) cooldown and repressurization ensued, causing
the RCS to enter the B&W-designated pressurized thermal shock (PTS) region. In
both instances (Hatch 1 and Rancho Seco) the RCS temperature was an involved
process variable and the integrity of the vessel was the affected second function. The
first safety function was the safety relief valve for the Hatch 1 incident and the
AFW system for Rancho Seco. This physical behaviour is generally treated in
recent event sequence analyses, as shown by the Event Sequence Diagrams for the
Seabrook study [7]. However, further study is needed to determine if the details of
these scenarios are explicitly treated in current analyses.
Based on the current results of the scenario search, two observations can be
made. The first observation is that although the 1969-1979 study has more
scenarios than the 1985 study, there are more scenarios that displayed physical
dependencies in 1985 than in 1969-1979. This could be partially explained by the
more detailed reporting in the later report. The second observation is that the data
base appears to contain only few scenarios involving physical dependencies. This
could be attributed to two factors. First, the actual occurrence rate of such
scenarios appears to be low (the occurrence rate of any scenarios involving multiple
8
failures, of which dependent failure scenarios are a subclass, is low), Second, the
description of events in the Precursor studies (especially the 1969-1979 study) may
not be detailed enough to determine all events that involved physical dependencies
(these studies were not designed to identify this type of dependency between failure
events).
3.3 Characterization of Scenarios
The physical dependencies identified in the previous section can be
categorized into three classes: direct physical dependencies, indirect physical
dependencies, and cyclical physical dependencies.
3.3.1 Direct Physical Dependency
Direct physical dependency entails direct interaction of two safety systems
(or functions) through process variables. The failure of one system alters the
magnitude of the involved process variable, which in turn, influences the
performance of another system. Figure 2 depicts this relationship. The process
variable either attains a value high enough to cause the second system to attempt to
change state or changes its magnitude at a rate faster than the considered safe limit
(e.g., excessive cooldown). The use of a set point value, which, if attained by a
specified process variable, signals a designated system to change its state, is
associated with failure modes of components (e.g., the PORV) in the current PRA
approach. The time rate of change of process variable magnitudes, however, are not
usually explicitly incorporated.
Two of the scenarios found displayed direct physical dependency. They are
the Hatch 1 (May 15, 1985) and the Rancho Seco (December 26, 1985) incidents.
As mentioned earlier, the systems (or functions) involved are the AFW and the
integrity of the pressure vessel for Rancho Seco and an SRV and the integrity of the
vessel for Hatch 1. The process variables are RCS temperature and pressure for
Rancho Seco, and RCS temperature for Hatch 1.
3.3.2 Indirect Physical Dependency
Indirect physical dependency requires an intermediary between the
demanded systems (Figure 3). The change in the process variable value, caused by
the performance of one system, leads the intermediate system to influence the state
or response of another system. Either the operators or a control system can act as
the intermediate participant. The TMI-2 accident stands out in this category. The
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first and second failure events in this case were the failure of a PORV to reclose and
the failure of the HPI system. Pressurizer water level was the process variable and
the operators acted as the intermediate system.
3.3.3 Cyclical Physical Dependency
Cyclical physical dependency involves the multiple occurrence of certain
events (Figure 4). An example of this is the multiple opening and closing of relief
valves experienced at Davis-Besse 1 (June 9, 1985), Catawba 1 (June 22, 1985), and
Hatch 1 (May 15, 1985). The opening and reclosing of the relief valves were the
affected functions (these are often separate top events in an event tree). The
involved process variable was the RCS pressure. Note that risk studies must often
accomodate cyclical events in a static framework using arbitrary assumptions (e.g.,
the assumption of a limited number of cycles before failure when analyzing
HPCI/RCIC systems in BWR PRAs).
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4. SURVEY OF CANDIDATE METHODOLOGIES
As discussed in Ref. 1, there are a number of methodologies discussed in the
literature that may be useful for incorporating plant physical behavior into accident
sequence analysis. The purposes of Tasks 2 and 3 of this study are to identify
specific implementations of these methodologies, and to characterize them in order
to determine their usefulness.
4.1 Desireable Attributes of Methodology
The above discussions on scenarios involving physical dependencies and some
limitations of the current event tree method in treating the scenarios naturally
suggest that an improved methodology should explicitly treat process variables.
Three important additional requirements are:
1. It must be dynamic, i.e., it must be time dependent. For example, it
must accomodate complex behavior introduced by control laws, feedback
loops, random timing of events, and the history of the sequence.
2. The accident sequence model created with the methodology must be
understandable to reviewers not involved in the construction of the
model.
3. The results of the model must also be readily understandable.
Satisfaction of the first requirement will allow clearer integration of models
for plant operators and control systems (as compared with the current event tree
methodology, where a single logical sequence may represent a wide variety of actual
sequences). The second requirement recognizes that the general ideas underlying a
particular event tree model are easy to understand (if not the details); an improved
methodology should strive for the same level of clarity, even though its details may
be more complicated. The third requirement also recognizes a strength of event
trees: their results are given in terms of easily understood and ranked scenarios.
This is a desirable goal and should be pursued by an improved method (to the
extent that it doesn't hide significant contributors to risk).
Four candidate approaches are: expanded event tree modeling, digraph
modeling, Markov modeling, and the Dynamic Logical Analytical Methodology
(DYLAM). Three of these four approaches will be discussed in the context of a
simple system, described below. The digraph modeling discussion is based on a
recently completed work which deals with accident sequence analysis [9].
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4.2 Description of the Example System
To better illustrate the characteristics of the candidate modeling approaches,
we employ an example system adopted from Ref. 9 (see Figure 5). This is a water
storage tank system with three control units (two pumps and one valve) and one
process variable (the water level).
During normal operation the water level is within a predefined nominal
control interval. Any control unit failure causes a system disturbance which could
lead to the water level moving out of the nominal interval, either above or below the
acceptable interval. Any unit failure and subsequent water level movement out of
the interval, however, does not necessarily result in system failure. The water level
can be brought back to the nominal interval or be kept within the still-considered
success region by the actions of the remaining operational control units.
The system fails when either a dryout or an overflow condition occurs.
Dryout happens when the water level is below the lower bound of the acceptable
interval; overflow occurs when the water level is higher than the upper bound. Both
failure states are considered absorbing states, i.e., the water level stays within these
intervals once it gets there. Control rules, which are dependent on the water level,
specify the actions of the control units as shown in Table 3.
Relevant assumptions on the properties of the system, useful for the purposes
of this demonstration, are:
1. Control units are either on or off.
2. Unit failure rates are constants.
3. Failed units are not repaired.
4. Unit failures are mutually statistically independent. There is no sharing
of common elements and consideration of common cause failure.
5. The operational state of a control unit at any particular time depends
solely on the magnitude of the water level (Table 3).
6. Control units respond with negligible time delay.
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4.3 Description, Application and Analysis of Candidate Methodologies
4.3.1 Expanded Event Trees
The event tree methodology, currently used as the standard approach for
accident sequence analysis in nuclear power plant risk studies, is well-documented
(e.g., [10-11]). This method represents the evolution of an accident as a sequence of
the states of the event tree "top events" (which can include safety systems or
operator actions) from an initiating event to some plant damage state. Plant
physical behavior enters in determining the consequences of each sequence (which
leads to the definition of plant damage states) and in determining the success
criteria for the safety systems (e.g., "auxiliary feedwater must be available for 30
minutes").
Although applicable to many scenarios, the event tree method does not
handle certain types of scenarios involving physical dependency. One method to
improve event trees is simply to increase its level of detail by defining more top
events, i.e., to expand the tree. A study of Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) plants
resulted in a substantially expanded LOFW event tree [12], containing 21 top events
(excluding the initiating event) (Figure 6). The tree treats operator actions and
functional headings in considerable detail. Expanded event trees have also been
used in human reliability studies. Heslinga [13] used repetition of trees to account
for recovery of a faulty action (Figure 7). Apostolakis and Chu, in their analysis of
the TMI-2 accident, allow transition among branches corresponding to different
headings to account for time-dependent human action [14]. NUREG-1150 applies
event tree expansion extensively in its containment analyses [15]. The number of
headings, some of which are in terms of process variables, in these event trees ranges
from 49 to 107. The tree headings can have more than two branches and can be
repeated at different stages of the scenario to account for time dependence.
Appendix A shows a list of questions which served as basis for the Surry
containment event tree headings.
Some typical modifications of event tree top events that could allow
treatment of process variables in an accident sequence analysis are:
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a. Inclusion of physical phenomena or process variables as headings in the
event trees (e.g. RCS pressure > 2200 psig).
b. Further division or splitting of tree headings. This can facilitate the
inclusion of process variables as headings and account for relative timing
of events.
c. Employment of more than the normal two branches under a heading.
d. Repetition of some of the headings. This could account for recurring
sequences and monitoring values of process variables.
To illustrate how the expanded event tree method would be used to handle
the hypothetical example system, the initiating event "pump 1 fails off" is
considered. The analysis assumes that the valve and pump 1 have equal flow rates
and that the pump 2 flow rate is half that of either pump 1 or the valve.
Figure 8 shows a state transition diagram for the system following the
initiating event "Pump 1 fails stopped." This diagram shows all of the possible
events that can follow the initiating event. Although this diagram is essentially an
event tree, it is somewhat more general than the trees typically used in PRAs.
Event headings are placed at each node (in boxes). Each box represents a
"snapshot". For example, Box 4 portrays the conditions: the water level is within
the nominal control region (but below its initial value), the valve is "good and
open," Pump 1 is "failed and stopped," and Pump 2 is "failed and running."
This representation allows incorporation of variable event timing (including
different orderings of events) and the explicit treatment of process variables. Note
that two calculations must be performed for each transition: the deterministic
calculation to determine changes in process variables, and the probabilistic
calculation to determine possible hardware state changes (see Appendix B for more
details on the latter). Each train of boxes, starting from the first box, constitutes
an accident sequence. Hence, the train of boxes 0-1-3-9-17-24-29 is the sequence
starting with the failure (off) of Pump 1 (Box 1), the failure (off) of the valve
(Box 3), and the failure (on) of Pump 2 (Box 9). When the water level rises above
the upper setpoint a2 (Box 24), the condition of Pump 1 changes from "failed and
stopped" to "failed and running," as prescribed by the assumptions given in
Section 3.2 and by Tables 3 and 5. The sequence eventually ends in an overflow
state (Box 29).
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The somewhat non-intuitive rules leading to Pump 1 changing states (from
stopped to running) while failed result from the modeling simplifications applied in
Ref. 9. That model concentrates on the comparision of the current state of a control
unit with its desired state; the manner by which the current state was reached is not
addressed. This reduces the amount of information that must be carried in the
analysis. This simplification, it should be noted, is not required by any of the
methods described in this report (including that of Ref. 9). Note also that if the
failure is assumed to be associated with the controls for the pump, rather than with
the pump itself, the rules of behavior may be rationalized somewhat.
Figure 9 presents a portion of a more conventional representation of the same
event sequences shown in Figure 8, being an expanded event tree based on the first
four boxes of Figure 8. Although Figure 9 has the benefit of being in a familiar
format, it is much less compact than Figure 8. Note that the expanded tree can
become extremely large when accounting for different orderings of failure events in
different sequences. Furthermore, the expanded event tree does not convey the
image of competing processes. For example, the notion that the first transition to
occur following the initiating event is the outcome of three parallel random
processes (water level dropping towards al, valve failure, Pump 2 failure) is much
clearer in Figure 8 than in Figure 9.
Thus, in the case of a single process variable, it appears that the general tree
diagram of Figure 8 is superior to the conventional expanded event tree of Figure 9.
However, both are probably too complicated to employ for situations requiring the
explicit treatment of more than one process variable or multiple component states.
Even a simple increase in the number of components analyzed increases the
complexity of both representations tremendously.
This discussion shows how event trees can explicitly handle process variables
through expansion (assuming that there is a process variable simulator to calculate
the system physics and update the process variable values). This method is easy in
principle and allows decomposition of the tree into smaller and more manageable
parts. Human actions can be incorporated in expanded event trees in the same
manner as used for conventional event trees.
On the other hand, the methodology is still inherently static. Loops or even
simple events at multiple points in time cannot be treated without some arbitrary
truncation rules. Furthermore, the treatment of several process variables at the
same time can lead to even greater complexity. All of these problems will lead to
extremely (and probably excessively) large trees when dealing with realistic accident
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sequence models. Thus, "conventional" static expanded event trees appear to be
impractical for realistic applications. However, if they are modified to treat time
explicitly, they can be much more promising. This modification is at the heart of
the DYLAM methodology, discussed in Section 4.3.4.
4.3.2 Digraphs
One of the problems mentioned in the case of expanded event trees is that
the tree cannot handle loops without some arbitrary truncation rule. This problem
is also discussed in Ref. 14. An alternate graphical approach, which allows the
correct treatment of loops, involves the use of directed graphs (or digraphs).
Digraphs consist of nodes and directed arcs between the nodes. The nodes
can represent different system states (similar to Figure 8), or the value of individual
system state variables. In the former case, the arcs indicate how transitions can be
made between states; in the latter case, an arc indicates how state variable can
influence another.
Numerous examples of digraph models for nuclear power plant system
analysis can be found in the literature (e.g., [16,17]). In most such cases, the
digraph is constructed during an intermediate step of the analysis. First, the system
is modeled with a digraph. Second, fault trees are constructed from the digraph to
determine how specific perturbations may arise.
The Logic Flowgraph Methodology (LFM) discussed in Ref. 16 appears to be
one of the most promising of the digraph analysis methods, due to its simultaneous
treatment of process variables and hardware states. However, because it is used to
produce input to a fault tree, it requires the discretization of the process variables
into a small number (5) of discrete, qualitative levels. The definition of these levels
(typically {Very Low, Low, Nominal, High, Very High}), and the propagation of
level disturbances through the system, is accomplished with significant amounts of
judgment. Thus, LFM models are often difficult to generate and tend to be
extremely difficult to review. It should be emphasized that the methodology is
designed to assist an operator in on-line disturbance analysis (i.e., fault diagnosis),
rather than to handle a full dynamic accident from beginning to end. Thus, it is
tailored to deal with system perturbations; large changes over time are not
considered.
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Ref. 8 develops an alternative methodology, called the quantitative digraph
(QD) approach, in an attempt to apply an LFM-like approach to accident sequence
analysis. The objective of the model is to determine how the system can proceed
through a given state space (e.g., {Pressure, Temperature, Mass}) to an undesired
end state by hardware changes, and how long it takes to do this. Like LFM, the QD
approach applies a varied set of operators for its nodes. Unlike LFM, the process
variables are treated quantitatively (they can be discretized arbitrarily). System
equations are used to determine possible transitions between discrete levels in the
process variables (depending on which systems succeed or fail in the next time
interval). This creates a data base linking transitions to hardware state changes, a
data base which can be used when attempting to determine how a particular
transition (or series of transitions) can arise.
The QD method is very similar to the DYLAM method, discussed later in
this report. However, it is deductively oriented, whereas DYLAM is inductive. The
problem with QD, therefore, is that it requires extremely large amounts of
processing (transitions cannot be ignored a priori because their likelihood cannot be
determined outside of the context of a scenario). Like static expanded event trees,
therefore, digraphs appear to be impractical for general use in accident sequence
analyses involving explicit treatment of process variables.
4.3.3 Markov Modeling
Markov models can be viewed as specialized digraph models, where the nodes
represent the system states, and the arcs represent the transitions between states.
Unlike the digraphs discussed above, time delays during transitions are modeled
explicitly (they are assumed to be random variables with exponential distributions).
The essential feature of Markov models is that the system is assumed to be
memoryless; transitions are assumed only to depend on the current state (and not
how the system arrived in the current state). Markov models have been widely
applied to systems where repairs can be made; applications to large nuclear systems
are discussed in Ref. 18.
An interesting application of Markov modeling to the problem of system
analysis, including the treatment of process variables, has been developed by
Aldemir [9,19,20]. In this approach, the system states are defined in terms of
process variables and component configuration. The system dynamics are modeled
using a discrete space-discrete time representation. The object of the majority of
the analysis is to develop the matrix M:
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M ={m} 1 i,j N (1)
where
m. . E P{transition from state i to state j in next At I in state i}
N number of states
The likelihood of being in any given state at time t can then be found using:
P(t) = M -P(t - At) (2)
where P(t) is the vector of probabilities for being in each of the N states at time t.
The physical equations governing system behavior are incorporated when
determining the m. . Thus, this approach can handle component state changes that
are deterministically triggerred by the process physics by including them in the
system equations (e.g. PORV opening when setpoint pressure is reached) and those
state changes caused by random transition independent of the process physics (e.g.
failures and repairs). Ref. 9 presents an algorithm that makes the mechanization of
matrix construction possible.
In general, the Markov approach can be summarized as follows.
a. Define events of interest. The events of interest are defined by
specifying the allowed range of values that process variables may take
(e.g., tank level must remain in a given range).
b. Identify the structural units (systems or components) and their possible
states. This step evaluates component behaviors relative to the process
variables. It may require the conduct of failure modes and effects
analysis to help ensure completeness of the system study.
c. Prepare database or system model. When a system simulation model is
already available, the analyst can use it to generate data needed for the
probability calculation. When such model is not available, this step
involves the creation of a system failure model. The model consists of
algebraic or differential equations that describe dynamic hardware and
process variable interactions and of the state space representation of the
system behavior.
d. Develop transition matrix, using failure rate and repair rate data for
structural units, and the system model (to provide constraints on
possible transitions).
e. Evaluate probability vector P(t).
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To simplify the application of this methodology to the storage tank problem
described earlier, Ref. 9 makes the following assumptions.
1. The probability that the water level is anywhere within a given control
range (e.g., a1  x < a2) is constant. Thus, the actual value of the
water level becomes irrelevant as long the interval is known.
2. Control units (i.e., the pumps and valve) do not change states in the
interval [t,t+At). Unit states may change instantaneously at t+At.
The step by step application to the example system of the Markov method is
then as follows.
a. Define event of interest. The events of interest are dryout (x < a) and
overflow (x > b).
b. Identify structural units and their possible states. There are three
control units. Each unit has two states: operational and failed. The
unit operational state as a function of water level is shown in Table 3.
c. Prepare system model. Based on the additional assumption #1 and the
control rules (Table 3), it is convenient to divide the control region into
three control intervals as shown in Table 4. Each control interval may
be further divided into subintervals if the analyst deems it appropriate
or necessary. Table 5 shows the state of each control unit in each
interval. The water level change rate equations for the each component
states combination are shown in Table 6. These relationships describe
the system physics.
d. Evaluate transition matrix M. See Appendix C.
e. Evaluate probability. This simply applies Eq. (2).
The equations needed to construct the transition matrix are given in
Appendix C. These equations have been implemented in a computer program and
compared against the published results of Ref. 9 with reasonable success.
The primary strengths of the Markov approach described above are that: it
explicitly accounts for process variable variation and control laws modifying system
configuration according to process variable variations, and that it incorporates time
explicitly. An additional characteristic is that, like other analytically based
approaches, it calculates results for rare event sequences as easily as it does for
19
likely event sequences. This can be contrasted with the results obtained from
simulation approaches, where rare event sequences may not be sampled at all.
The primary weakness of the approach is that it requires explicit evaluation
of the transition matrix M. This matrix can get unmanageably large for even a
modest number of process variables and component states; if there are N process
variables, each with n i levels, and M components, each with m J states, the matrix is
of dimension [N M N M -
] z |~ng-~| by N i In -] -j= =1 I = I3 1 -
It should also be noted that, if the system structure changes dynamically, the
matrix must be reevaluated for each time step if the transition probabilities change
dynamically.
The problem of large transition matrices in systems not involving process
variables is generally treated by using state-merging and truncation techniques
(e.g., [18,21,22]). These need to be explored in the context of systems involving
continuous variables.
A second disadvantage of the approach is inherent in its assumptions; it
neglects past events when computing transition probabilities. In the case of simple
physical systems, this is often a reasonable approximation. However, it seems likely
that in the course of an accident sequence, past history will be important because
this will affect operator decisions. Thus, this assumption is a limitation when
operator models are to be integrated into the analysis.
A third problem, less important than the first two, is that the procedure to
mechanically generate the transition matrix can become extremely complicated
when there are more than three process variables involved. This is largely a
problem of dividing the control region into disjoint partitions and defining failure
values of variables within the partition boundary.
4.3.4 Dynamic Logical Analytical Methodology (DYLAM)
The last methodology to be reviewed is like the event tree methodology, and
different from the digraph and Markov methodologies, in that it is inductive, rather
than deductive. Unlike the event tree methodology, it is also simulation oriented.
In other words, the model is developed dynamically as it is executing according to a
built-in set of rules. Accident scenarios are therefore defined implicitly (via the
rules), rather than explicitly.
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Dynamic Logical Analytical Method (DYLAM) is a simple simulation-based
method for dynamic modeling and reliability assessment of a system [5,23-27]. In
general, a system model is constructed by linking component models; these latter
consist of equations for the process variables which are dependent on the component
state. For example, a model for a pump may consist of an equation for the pump
Ap as a function of the pump state. System failure is defined in terms of process
variables (e.g., too little flow).
As applied to accident sequence analysis, the DYLAM approach can be
summarized as follows. Starting at some inital state, the methodology requires the
development, in principle, of all possible changes of state in a given At. The system
equations are then used to update the values of process variables associated with
each branch implied by a change in state. The process is repeated until all
sequences being traced end at some absorbing state (e.g., core damage). Truncation
rules are used to limit the size of the model as it is being constructed.
The main steps of the DYLAM analysis procedure are as follows:
1. Model all components in the system. This step identifies the component
failure and degradation states, describes the analytical relationships
involving the different process variables for all component states, and
then assigns the component state transition rates or relationship.
2. Develop algorithm to resolve system equations. This step designs the
method to solve the equations generated in the preceding step.
3. Define events of interest. This refers to the assignment of the system
conditions which must be searched for. Top events can be defined in
terms of values of process variables of interest, such as values which
must not be exceeded to prevent undesired states. More than one top
event can be studied in the same run.
4. Generate and analyze event sequences. This step generates possible
event sequences using probabilistic or combinatorial rules. Starting with
the initial conditions and sytem state, DYLAM updates the conditions,
e.g. process variable values, and the likelihood of the state with time.
When a time point or situation in which state change is likely is
reached, DYLAM starts a new path incorporating the possible state
change and appropriate conditions and, at the same time, maintains the
initial path. Then, DYLAM continues to update the paths and acts
similarly when either or both paths encounter point of possible state
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change. DYLAM periodically compares the process variable values with
the desired values and the current time with the maximum simulation
time. Time points or situations of potential state change can be
determine through probabilistic rules or conditioned on process variable
values.
DYLAM can therefore be simply described as a simulation-based dynamic
event tree generator. Event tree branchings occur at discrete points in time. Each
branching can (and usually should) result in multiple branches, each branch
corresponding to a possible set of system changes.
To avoid event sequence explosion, Ref. 5 establishes cut-off rules. Cut-off
rules include preassigning a sequence probability level and prefixing the order of
sequences to be generated. The order of the sequence refers to the number of failed
states in a sequence. Branching rules, such as allowing branching out to occur only
at time points when the probability of the sequence has dropped below a preset
fraction of the initial sequence probability, also helps preclude event sequence
explosion from occurring.
The step by step application of DYLAM to the example problem is described
below.
1. Model all components in the system. Table 7 belows shows the results
of the failure mode and effect analysis. "Operational" means that the
control unit functions as prescribed by the control rules (Table 3).
Table 8 gives the flowrate as a function of component state and water
level. The system equations are as follows:
(t) = i 1 (t) + k2 (t) + k3 (t)
x(t + At) = x(t) + i(t)At
2. Develop algorithm to resolve system equations. In this case, the
equations are easily resolved without any special algorithm.
3. Define events of interest. The event of interest is the occurrence of
either dryout (x < a) or overflow (x > b).
4. Generate and analyze event sequences. A simple code was written to
simulate the process physics. The probability calculation, however, is
not automated. In this case all control units have constant failure rates
which are independent of the process physics (Table 7). DYLAM
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handles a component with an independent constant failure rate by
presetting a fraction of the initial reliability and allowing the component
to branch at times when the reliability has dropped below the preset
fraction of the initial reliability. After each branching, the initial
reliability takes on a new value. Applying this rule to the example
system, the three control units are assumed to branch out at the
following times and their multiples:
Valve: 700 minutes
Pump 1: 810 minutes
Pump 2: 915 minutes
Table 9 shows the reliability of each component as a function of time (in
minutes). Figure 10 shows an example on how to generate event sequences. Data
on the event sequences that satisfy the events of interest appear in Table 10.
As in the case of the Markov modeling approach, DYLAM can handle
dynamic aspects of the interaction between time dependent process variables,
hardware, and control systems. Unlike the Markov analysis, DYLAM is general
enough to allow modeling of scenarios in which past events can affect the likelihood
of state transitions, and therefore can handle important aspects of operator
behavior. DYLAM is also capable of dealing with arbitrary transition time
distributions (the Markov analysis is limited to exponential transitions, unless
matrix expanding techniques, e.g., the method of stages, are used).
DYLAM performs process simulation and reliability assessment in a
self-contained way. This gives much flexibility in the use of DYLAM. Once the
system model is installed, top events can be modified to analyze other events of
interest.
Finally, DYLAM uses the physical equations governing system behavior to
determine system success and failure. It eliminates the need of the analyst to judge
success criteria (both number of components and duration of operation), especially
in complicated cases (e.g., intermittent operation).
The primary problems with the DYLAM approach are those associated with
simulation approaches. First, because truncation algorithms are used, it is not
guaranteed to identify rare event sequences, even if these sequences have extremely
large consequences. Second, because the model consists essentially of computer
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implementations of system equations, determining principal contributors to risk
may be difficult, especially in cases where complicated control rules govern
transitions. In other words, the model may appear to be too much like a "black
box" to the user.
Of lesser importance, DYLAM calculations can be long and costly, since
DYLAM explicitly solves the equations governing the process physics. Thus, an
efficient algorithm used to resolve the system equations is highly desireable.
Moreover, system models should be made simple without losing the essentials. The
desire for simpler models, however, could affect the accuracy of the probability
calculation.
In general, it appears that the problems associated with DYLAM are less
fundamental than those associated with other methodologies. Truncation problems
can be addressed, to an extent, simply by reducing the truncation limits imposed on
a given run. The increase in computation time will be at least partially offset by
the availability of increasingly fast and inexpensive computers. The issue of a
"black box" model can be addressed by improving the sophistication of the model
(e.g., adding tracers to key variables) and by developing sensitivity analysis
procedures appropriate to the model. Our future work will therefore concentrate on
developing DYLAM for a realistic application to nuclear power plant accident
sequences, and on developing needed improvements to the DYLAM methodology.
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TABLE 1. 1969-79 PRECURSORS REVIEWED FOR PHYSICAL DEPENDENCIES
PLANT NAME
Dresden 3
Dresden 2
Humbolt Bay
Palisades
Lacrosse
Nine Mile Point 1
Vermont Yankee
Haddam Neck
Browns Ferry I
Pilgrim 1
Millstone 2
Millstone 1
Cooper
Cook 1
Davis-Besse I
Calvert Cliffs 1
TMI-2
Rancho Seco
St. Lucie I
Beaver Valley 1
Salem 1
Oyster Creek
Hatch 1
St. Lucie 1
Davis-Besse 1
TMI-2 *
Brunswick 1
DATE PLANT TYPE
Dec 8, 1971
May 5, 1970
Jul 17, 1970
Sep 2, 1971
Mar 24, 1971
Dec 31, 1971
Dec 1, 1972
Jan 19, 1974
Mar 22, 1975
Sep 13, 1975
Jul 20, 1976
Aug 10, 1976
Aug 31, 1977
Sep 1, 1977
Nov 29, 1971
Apr 13, 1978
Apr 23, 1973
Mar 20, 1978
May 14, 1978
Jul 28, 1978
Nov 27, 1978
May 2, 1979
Jun 3,1979
Sep 3, 1979
Oct 15, 1979
Mar 28, 1979
Nov 20, 1979
BWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
DESCRIPTION
Safety valve open after loss of feedwater(LOFW)
Depressurization event
Loss of offsite power(LOOP)
LOOP and failure of diesel generator to load
Loss of power
High coolant level
Loss of normal station power
LOOP
Cable tray fire caused extensive damage
LOOP and relief valve sticks open
Apparent LOOP and failure of sfty related cmpnent
Gas turbine fails during plant trip
Loss of no-break-power and feedwater control
Reactor trip and LOOP
LOOP
LOOP while shutdown
Multiple stuck-open relief valves
Failure of NNI and steam generator dryout
LOOP during refuelling
LOOP and diesel generator failure
Loss of vital instr bus-reactor trip
LOFW
HPCI fails to start given LOFW
Switchyard lockout due to cable drop during storm
Reactor trip without LOOP
LOFW and open PORV
RCIC turbine trip with HPCI unavailable
DEPENDENCIES INVOLVED
Functional,Spatial
Functional,Spatial
Functional
Functional
Functional,Spatial
Functional, S pati al, H um an
Functional
Functional
Function al,Spatial
Functional
Functional
Functional
Functional
Functional
Hum an
Functional
Functional
Functional
Functional, Human
Functional
Functional
Functional, Human
Functional, Hum an
Functional
Functional
Functional, Human,Physical
Functional
* indicates incident which involved physical dependency
TABLE 2. 1985 PRECURSORS REVIEWED FOR PHYSICAL DEPENDENCIES
PLANT NAME
Browns Ferry I
Brunswick I
Calvert Cliffs 2
Catawba 1*I
Catawba 1
Davis-Besse 1*
Farley 2
Grand Gulf 1
Hatch 1
Hatch 1*
Hatch 2
La Salle 1
La Salle I
Mcguire 1
Nine Mile Point
Oconee 1
Oyster Creek 1
Rancho Seco*
San Onofre 1
San Onofre 1
Trojan
Trojan
Turkey Point 3
Wolf Creek 1
DATE PLANT TYPE
Jan 16
Nov 2
Apr 25
Jun 22
Jun 13
Jun 9
Jul 15
Dec 31
Jan 6
May 15
Nov 5
Feb 8
May 31
Jan 28
Nov 1
Apr 25
Jun 12
Dec 26
Jun 16
Nov 21
Mar 9
Jul 20
Jul 22
Jun 9
BWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
BWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
BWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
DESCRIPTION
LOFW and RCIC inoperability
Reactor islation&scram plus RCIC&DG trips
Stuck-opern atmospheric dump valve
LOFW&sec-side relief valve problems
LOFW&sec-side relief valve problems
LOFW & AFW failure
Loss of power to 4160-V nonsafety buses
LOFW & HPCS failure
Loss of HPCI/RCIC during recovery from a trip
Stuck-open relief valve&HPCI/RCIC unavailability
LOFW & RCIC trip
LOFW & RCIC trip
Loss of circulating & nonsafety service water
Reactor trip with stuck-open SG relief valve
LOFW plus loss of one FWCI train & one ADS valve
LOFW and stuck-open relief valve
MSIV closure&scram with subsequent SDV isoltion
Loss of ICS and LOFW
One train of HPI,AFW,&FWCI unavailable
Effective LOOP and AFW system unavailability
Plant trip,LOFW & water hammer
AFW pumps fail on demand following trip
Multiple AFW train failures following LOFW
Startup LOFW & AFW pump trip
DEPENDENCIES INVOLVED
Functional
Functional
Functional
Functional,Physical
Functional
Func tional, Hum an, Phys ical
Functional
Functional
Functional
Functional,Physical
Functional
Functional
Functional,Spatial
Functional
Functional
Functional
Functional
Func tional, Hum an, Physical
Functional
Functional, Human
Functional
Functional
Functional
Functional
* indicates incident which involved physical dependency
TABLE 3
OPERATIONAL UNIT STATES AS A FUNCTION OF WATER LEVEL
Control Unit State
Water Level Valve Pump1 Pump 2
i -< X < a2 on on off
on
offX< aXi
off
on
off
on
TABLE 4
CONTROL INTERVALS
Interval Number (r)
1
2
3
Interval (Vr.
a < x < aXi
i xs - aC2
TABLE 5
OPERATIONAL AND FAILED UNIT STATES IN Vr
Operational States Failed States
Interval Valve Pumpl Pump2 Valve Pump1 Pump2
Vi 2 1 1 1 2 2
V 2  1 1 2 2 1 1
V3 1 2 2 2 1 1
1 - open or on ; 2 - closed or off
TABLE 6
WATER LEVEL CHANGE RATE AS A FUNCTION OF CONTROL UNIT
STATES AND CORRESPONDING UNIT STATE COMBINATION (n)
Control Unit
Valve Pump1
on on
on on
on
on
off
off
off
off
off
off
on
on
off
off
State
Pump2
on
off
on
off
on
off
on
off
n Rate of Level
Change
1 -X1+X2+k3
2 -X 1+X*2
3 
- I1+X3
4
5
6
7
8
- X1
i2+ i3
X2
03
0
111
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
D6.k
n2
1
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
i
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
nk = 1 , open or on; 2, closed or off
TABLE 7
COMPONENT STATES AND TRANSITION RATES
Component
Valve
Pump 1
Pump2
Condition/State
1 - operational
2 - failed
1 - operational
2 - failed
1 - operational
2 - failed
Probability
5.2
7.6
9.5
x 10-5/min
x 10-5/min
x 10-5/min
TABLE 8
COMPONENT FLOWRATES
Component
Valve
Pump1
Pump2
Water Level
(1 < X a2
a 2 < X
a2 < X
X < al
x < cXI
(XI X C2
aX1  X a 2
a2 < X
a2 < X
x<ai
x< al
aixsa2
al x - c12
a2 < X
a2 < X
x < C
x < ci
State
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
Flowrate _fLt
X1
0
kI
0
0
XI
X2
0
0
i2
0
0
X3
0
X3
X3
0
Valve
Time
0-699
700-1399
1400-2099
2100-2799
TABLE 9
RELIABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME
Pump 1 Pump 2
Reliability Time Reliability Time Reliability
1 0-809 1 0-914 1
.9645 810-1619 .94030 915-1829 .91675
.92979 1620-2429 .88416 1830-2744 .84042
.89655 2430-3239 .83137 2745-3658 .77045
TABLE 10
DATA ON SEQUENCES
Sequence System State
Number
1
2
3
4
5
6
8
9
11
12
16
17
18
19
20
23
24
25
27
3 1
32
35
V-1;P1-1;P2-1
V-1;PI-1;P2-0
V-1;P1-0;P2-1
V-1;P1-1;P2-0
V-i;P1-0;P2-1
V-I;P1-1;P2-0
V-1;P1-1;P2-1
V-1;P1-1;P2-1
V-1;P1-1;P2-0
V-1;P1-1;P2-1
V-I;P1-1;P2-1
V-i;P1-0;P2-1
V-0;P1-1;P2-1
V-1;P1-1;P2-1
V-i;P1-0;P2-1
V-1;P1-1;P2-0
V-i;P1-0;P2-1
V-1;P1-1;P2-0
V-i;P1-1;P2-1
V-i;P1-1;P2-1
V-i;P1-0;P2-1
V-1;Pl-1;P2-0
REACHING
Event
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Dryout
Dryout
Dryout
Dryout
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
Dryout
Overflow
Overflow
Overflow
DRYOUT OR OVERFLOW
Time Event Sequence
Attained Probability
978 .000178
1009 .001957
1312 .002799
1819 .003797
2227 .005044
2629 .005067
1600 .0003489
2300 .0005141
1797 .003843
2300 .0009856
1681 .0006771
1799 .005168
2019 .008967
2455 .001452
2499 .007160
1819 .007456
2227 .009906
2630 .009950
2300 .001388
2454 .002021
2498 .009963
2629 .01466
0 - operational ; 1 - failed
RPS | FVS I PORVopens IPORVCloses I
U
HPIS SEQUENCE
T
Ta
TQO
TP
TB
TrO
T5UO
TBP
TK
TKG
T - transient initiating event
K - reactor trip
B - heat removal via steam generator
P - PORV opensQ - PORV recloses
U - high pressure injection system
Figure 1. TMI -2 Incident Using Oconee Event Tree
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Figure 2. Direct Physical Dependency
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Figure 3. Indirect Physical Dependency
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Figure 4. Cyclical Physical Dependency
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x(t),x - water level
x(t),x - time rate of change of water level
a,b - lower and upper bounds on water level respectively
XC9, X2 - set points
X0 - nominal water level , Ci X0  02
t - time
Figure 5. The Hypothetical Example System
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Figure 7. A Sample Use of Event Tree in Human Reliability Analysis
x - water level
Xo - nominal water level
0(1 - lower setpoint
12 - hidher set iooint
a - lower bound on water level
> - upper bound on water level
V - valve
P1 - pumpI
P2 - pump2
0 - open
C - closed
R - runninA
S - stopped
FO - failed and open
FC - failed and closed
FS - failed ans stopped
FR - failed and running
CIO - either closed or ooen
RIS - either running or stopped
X P - pump 1 f ailure rate
AP2 - pump 2 failure rate
V- valve total failure rate
* - system configuration
oscillates
XVA,XP2A - rate valve/pump2
fails when X<1
XVB,XP2B - rate valve/pump 2
fails when X=*(I
WA
Figure 6. The State Transition Diagram of the System
AINITIATING EVENT:
PUMP1 FAILS OFF
WHILE WATER LEVEL
IS NOMINAL AND PUMP
2 AND VALVE ARE OK
B
WATER LEVEL IS
ABOUT 02 WHILE
THE VALVE AND PUMP
2 ARE OK AND PUMP1
IS FAILED AND OFF
C
VALVE FAILS OFF
WHILE WATER LEVEL
IS STILL WITHIN THE
NOMINAL INTERVAL,
PUMP1 IS FAILED AND
OFF, AND PUMP2 IS OK
D
PUMP2 FAILS ON
WHILE WATER LEVEL
IS STILL WITHIN THE
NOMINAL REGION, THE
VALVE IS OK, AND
PUMP1 IS FAILED AND
OFF
SEQUENCE
SEQUENCE# PROBABILITY
YES r
1 P{A}P{I|A}P{|A,5}P{5|A,B,5}
2 P{A}P{BIA}P{CIA,B}P{DIAB,C}
3 P{A}P{BIA}P{CIA,B}
4 P{A}P{BA}
Figure 9. Expanded Event Tree Covering Boxes 1 to 4
. . .
SEQUENCE
111 *
110
101
110
101
110
100
111
111
011
110
111
011
110
010
111
101
-4-----011
-~z 111
101
011
001
110
101
110
100
111
011
110
010
111
101
011
001
110
100
mZ 010
1k2 000
t=2700 min
Athe numbers indicate the states of the system;
the first, second , and third digits correspond
to the states of valve, pump 1, and pump 2
respectively (0 - good, 1 - failed)
SEQUENCE $1
1*
2*
3*
4.
5*
6*
7
8'
9.
10
11*
12*
13
14
15
16*
17'
18*
19*
20*
21
22
23*
24'
25*
26
27*
28
29
30
31*
32*
33
34
35.
36
37
38
indicates that dryout or
overflow is reached
before t = 27000 min
Figure 10. DY LAM Event Sequence Generation
to tal tb1 tc1 ta2 tb2 tc2 ta3
to = 0 min
tal = 700 min
tb1 = 810 min
tc1 = 915 min
ta2 = 1400 min
tb2 = 1620 min
tc2 = 1830 min
ta3 = 2100 min
tb3 = 2430 min
Appendix A. Questions which Served as Bases for the Headings of
Surry Containment Event Tree
1. Is AC power available after the initiating event?
2. Does emergency core cooling fail prior to over pressurization of the
containment?
3. What is the level of pre-existing containment leakage or isolation
failure?
4. Where is the initial reactor coolant system break?
5. What is the size of the initial coolant system break?
6. Is the containment initially bypasssed?
7. Are the steam generators wet or dry?
8. Do the fan coolers fail to actuate before the core degradation?
9. Do the containment sprays fail to actuate in the injection mode
before core degradation?
10. Do the containment sprays fail to actuate in the recirculation mode
before core degradation?
11. To what degree, if any, is the auxiliary building initially bypassed?
12. Where, if at all, is there a temperature-induced failure of the
reactor coolant system during the period of core degradation?
13. What is the size of the reactor coolant system failure?
14. What is the primary system pressure during the core degradation?
Also, what would be the containment pressure increment from a
primary system blowdown?
15. At what level, if any, is containment bypassed during core
degradation?
16. What is the rate of blowdown to the containment during core
degradation?
17. Do the containment sprays fail to actuate during the period of core
degradation?
18. Is there containment heat removal during core degradation?
19. At what level, if any, does containment fail due to steam
pressurization before vessel breach?
20. What is the containment pressure before vessel breach?
21. Is there a hydrogen burn before vessel breach? Also, what is the
pressure increment from such a burn?
22. Does containment fail because of a hydrogen burn before vessel
breach? Also, what is the associated failure pressure and standard
deviation?
23. To what degree, if any, is the auxiliary building bypassed before
vessel breach?
24. Do the fan coolers fail after the early hydrogen burn?
25. Do the containment sprays fail after the early hydrogen burn?
26. Is there containment heat removal after the early hydrogen
burn?
27. What is the mode of vessel breach?
28. Does direct heating of the containment atmosphere occur just after
vessel breach? Also, what is the pressure increment from a steam
spike alone and from a steam spike plus a direct heating?
29. Is there a hydrogen burn just after vessel breach? Also, what is
the pressure increment from such a burn?
30. Does containment fail due to a steam pike, direct heating, and/or
hydrogen burn just after vessel breach?
31. What is the mode of containment failure, if any, just after vessel
breach?
32. To what degree, if any, is the auxiliary building bypassed just after
vessel breach?
33. Do the fan coolers fail after vessel breach?
34. Do the containment sprays fail after vessel breach?
35. Is there an oxidation release?
36. Is AC power restored after vessel breach?
37. Do the fan coolers fail late in the accident?
38. Do the containment sprays fail late in the accident?
39. Is there containment heat removal late in the accident?
40. Has the inventory of refuelling water storage tank been injected
into containment?
41. What is the amount of water injected into containment?
42. Do significant core-concrete interactions occur after vessel breach?
43. Is AC power recovered late in the accident?
44. What is the containment pressure late in the accident?
45. Has a large leak or gross failure occurred late in the accident?
46. Does a later hydrogen burn occur?
47. What pressure rise would occur if combustible gases were to burn
late in the accident?
48. Would containment fail due to a late hydrogen burn or steam
production?
49. In what way, if at all, does containment fail due to gradual
pressurization from water boiloff or noncondensible gases or
hydrogen burning (leakage or gross rupture)?
50. To what degree,if any, is the auxiliary building bypassed late in the
accident?
51. Do the fan coolers fail after the late hydrogen burn?
52. Do the containment sprays fail after the late hydrogen burn?
53. Is there containment heat removal very late in the accident?
54. Does basemat meltthrough occur, given no prior containment
failure?
55. Does containment depressurize after basemat meltthrough?
56. What is the ultimate containment failure mode, if any, resulting
from core-concrete interactions?
57. To what degree, if any, is the auxiliary building bypassed very late
in the accident?
Appendix B. Split Fraction Calculation for the Expanded
Event Tree Covering Boxes 1 to 4
x~ a
ta =
v- time it takes for water level to reach al given box 1
condition
tv- time it takes for valve to fail given box 1
condition; t, is exponentially distribyted
tp- time it takes for pump 2 to fail given box 1
condition; tp is exponentially distributed
Pt1 - probability of branch 1 in Figure 9
P{2} - probability of branch 2 in Figure 9
P{3} - probability of branch 3 in Figure 9
fv(tv),Fv(tv) - probability density function and cumulative
distribution function of tv respectively
fp(tp),Fp(tp) - probability density function and cumulative
distribution function of tp respectively
f(t) = (Xt)exp(-Xt) - probability density function of an exponentially
distributed random variable t
t
F(t) = f(t)dt
o - cumulative distribution function of random
variable t
P{1} = P{ B I A }
=P{ t>ta,tp >ta}
= [1- Fv(tv)] [1- Fp(tp)], tv and tp are independent
P{2} = P{ C I A,}
= P{ t p > tv I min(ty, tp) < tao}
= P{ t > 0 1 min(ty, tp) < taX }, t = tp - tv
= 1- Ft(0)
where,
ta t+ty
Ft(t) = f fv(tv) [ f fp(tp)dt, ] dtv
0 0
P{3} = Pt D I A, 5, C I
= P{ tp < tv I min(ty, tp) < ta , tp < tv}
= 1.0
Appendix C. Aldemir-Derived Probabilistic Equations
N 5
Pn,r(t+At) = q, n(A t)p',r(t)
n= 1 r'= 1
where
3
qn" r(A t) = ( )Ic(n In ,r'--r,At) Jdx' er(x'+xAt)
r k=1 xr'
if r'=1,2,3; r=1,2,2
8
( ) Jdx' er(x'+xAt)
Xr'
if r'=1,2,3; r=4,5
= 
5 n',nr',r , otherwise
ck (nk In' kr'-+r,At) = 1-XkAt, if unit is operational at t and at t+At
Xk, if unit is operational at t but not at t+A t
1, if unit is failed at t and at t+A t
0, otherwise
r - subscript to indicate particular interval r, where
r = 1,2,3,4(dryout), 5(overflow)
Vr - control interval r, r =1,2,3,4,5
Xr - length of interval Vr
N - number of possible combinations of unit states, N=8
n(t),n - designation number of control unit state combinations
n= 1,..,N
nk - control unit state, k=1(operational), 2(failed)
Pn,r(t) - Pr{n(t) = n, x(t) e Vr}
p(n,x,t) - Prfn(t) = n, x(t)=x}
Sn' , n - Kronecker delta, Sn' , n = 1 if n'= n , 0 otherwise
er(x) - step function, er(x) = 1 if x E Vr, 0 otherwise
qn',r'(A t) - Markov transition matrix elements
n,r
- Pr{x(t+At)e VrIX(t)E Vr',n(t)=n'}
Pr{n(t+At) = ni n(t)=n',x(t+At)e Vr,x(t)E Vr'}
ck(nkInk',r'-4r,At) - Pr{n(t+At) = nkl n(t)=nk',x(t)e Vr' -4x(t+At)E Vr}
